If the QSR slows down, is it the GDO that satisfies the customer's hunger?
There's no point beating around the bush: the foodservice industry is struggling, and the post-pandemic boom was a flash in the pan, ultimately suffocated by the lack of oxygen from the economic crisis and the decline in Out Of Home consumption, as certified by multiple indicators and analyses.
This reality is clear to most and can be confirmed through conversations with various industry operators, with the exception of press releases promoted by associations and entities interested in projecting the credibility of an outdated sector within an industry that should be central to the country.
What do the Realytics data really tell us about Esselunga and Lidl Italia, in an analysis of the first brand with a subsequent comparison to the second in the Italian market, and why should those working in foodservice take notice and reflect?
Over the past two years, in the world of foodservice, and particularly in QSR, an ambiguous narrative has spread: on one hand, people say "the market is saturated", on another that "the consumer has changed", and on yet another that "the problem is costs".
All true, but only partially. The risk, as often happens, is looking at the sector in isolation, while food consumption is a single system that continuously redistributes itself between home and out-of-home.
If QSR is slowing down today, the right question is not why people are no longer going out, but: where and how are they solving the "food" need, and what are the drivers behind changes in these habits.
To find answers, I turned to the powerful engine of Realytics with specific inputs on the large-scale retail trade (GDO): the findings are very useful and depict daily, rational, repeated consumption, far less influenced by hype than trends in restaurants and #foodservice.
Whereas restaurant formats launched by influencers, rappers, TikTokers, and TV personalities have worked (only to partly fade away), trends do not take hold in the GDO, as demonstrated by the flop of BOEM by the duo Fedez and Lazza. It is a more pragmatic, conscious purchase.
I examined the data using the query: Italy | Food & Grocery Retail | Jan–Dec 2025, focusing on two chains that, more than others, represent two opposing mental models that are today increasingly intertwined: Esselunga and Lidl.
Not to declare a winner, but to understand how the Italian consumer truly thinks in 2025.
Esselunga: excellent performance, but a clear maturity curve
Let's start with Esselunga's key numbers, because they are the ones most often read superficially.
In 2025, Esselunga reports:
• Market Performance Score: 92, with a –2 YoY change
• Customer Satisfaction (CSAT): 73.8%, –0.5 points YoY
• Number of stores: 202
These numbers tell a precise story: Esselunga continues to be an extremely efficient machine, with overall performance well above the market average. But at the same time, something has stopped growing.
The point is not the decline itself, which is marginal. The point is the direction.
When a historically very strong chain stops improving customer satisfaction, while still maintaining traffic and relevance, it means the experience is no longer evolving at the same pace as expectations. This is the classic signal of a brand that has reached full maturity: it doesn't lose customers, but it loses emotional intensity.
The customer comes in because they know it "works", not because they actively choose it.
From a strategic standpoint, this is the ideal breeding ground for the behavior we now see everywhere: systematic cross-shopping.
A closer look at Lidl reveals a lower CSAT compared to Esselunga's 73.8%, which conceals an enormous strategic advantage, showing:
• Customer Satisfaction: 66%
• Number of stores: 810
If we stopped here, the comparison would be trivial. But the data point that completely changes the reading is in the topic benchmarking, particularly on perceived pricing:
• Pricing – Esselunga: 61%
• Pricing – Lidl: 82%
This is one of the most important data points in the entire report, because it doesn't speak to actual price, but to the perceived coherence between value and expenditure.
Today's consumer feels that Lidl is a place where the price "makes sense". Not necessarily because it's always the lowest, but because it doesn't generate cognitive dissonance.
In an economic context where:
• eating out costs more
• grocery spending weighs more heavily on the household budget
• the consumer is forced to choose where to indulge and where not to
Lidl intercepts a fundamental psychological need: not feeling foolish while spending.
This explains why a chain with a lower CSAT can still grow in relevance and penetration.
Where Esselunga truly dominates: the engineering of experience
If we drill down into the experience topic details, Esselunga shows a clear, structural, and consistent superiority across the entire customer journey:
• Assortment: 92% (share 33%) vs Lidl 88% (share 29%)
• Inventory availability: 84% vs Lidl 72%
• Product findability: 73% vs Lidl 52%
• Purchase completion: 50% vs Lidl 29%
• Staff service: 64% vs Lidl 50%
• Store environment: 79% vs Lidl 66%
• Store access: 82% vs Lidl 76%
These numbers tell a very clear story: Esselunga systematically reduces friction — you find what you're looking for, you complete your purchase, you move through a readable space, you perceive order.
And here comes the first direct connection to QSR: when a consumer experiences such a seamless shopping experience every week, they automatically raise the bar of tolerance for any out-of-home food experience.
Queues, waits, confusing menus, hard-to-justify prices, unintuitive ordering processes: all of these weigh more heavily, because the mental comparison is no longer with "another restaurant", but with a daily experience that is by now very well designed.
Esselunga: a bourgeois, northern format?
Customer Satisfaction by geographic area is one of the most interesting points in the report:
• Tuscany: 78.2% (+1.7pp)
• Lazio: 77.4% (+2.6pp)
• Veneto: 76.7% (+1.3pp)
• Piedmont: 76.8% (–0.8pp)
• Liguria: 75.1% (–2.9pp)
Here the message is crystal clear: there is no meaningful "national average".
The brand holds up everywhere, but the experience varies noticeably from region to region.
This suggests differences in:
• store maturity
• operational pressure
• layout
• local expectations
And this is exactly the same dynamic we see today in QSR: theoretically identical formats that perform in completely different ways depending on the context.
Cross-shopping: for Esselunga, the definitive end of loyalty
Perhaps the most revealing data point is on cross-shopping. Esselunga customers also shop at:
• Coop: 26.7%
• Lidl: 22%
• Conad: 18.1%
• Carrefour: 15.2%
• Eurospin: 14.3%
This means one thing only: loyalty is dead, personal strategy is born.
The Italian consumer builds their own portfolio of chains:
• Esselunga to reduce risk (assortment, reliability)
• Lidl to optimize cost and simplicity
• other chains for specific needs
And it is the same mental framework applied to eating out: they don't stop going out, but they only go when they perceive clear value.
When satisfaction erodes: the experience under stress.
Esselunga's hourly traffic: a different purchase moment from QSR.
Hourly traffic shows sharp peaks in the late afternoon, particularly between 5:00 PM and 7:00 PM.
This is where true Customer Satisfaction is won or lost: the experience is not won when the store is empty — it is lost when it is full.
The slight CSAT decline at Esselunga is consistent with growing operational pressure during these time slots. And in QSR the mechanism is identical: the real product is not what you serve, but how you handle demand when it peaks.
Esselunga: Who is really sustaining consumption
Last data points, but fundamental:
• Affinity by gender:
• Men: 108%
• Women: 90%
• Affinity by generation:
• Gen X: 106%
• Gen Y: 90%
• Gen Z: 85%
This tells us that structured consumption today is sustained primarily by a mature, pragmatic, rational audience. Younger consumers shop less frequently, are more selective, and far less indulgent.
QSR, which for years built formats around "automatic" frequency, now faces a customer who thinks before going out.
Conclusion
The Realytics data are not saying that Esselunga is losing to Lidl, nor that the discount format is the absolute future. They are saying something deeper: the Italian consumer has become a conscious manager of their own food consumption.
They optimize, compare, reduce friction, tolerate inefficiency less, and apply the same criteria to both grocery shopping and eating out.
If QSR is slowing down today, it is not because "people no longer go out" — it is because the GDO is solving the "food" problem more and more effectively, and out-of-home dining must once again justify its role.
Not with hype or noise, but with real, measurable, consistent value.
Will QSR hybridize in order to expand and avoid being cannibalized by the GDO, or will hybridizing actually weaken it?